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We study a simple contracting game with a principal and two agents. Contracts exert an 
externalities on non contractors. The principal can either contract both agents in a 
centralized manner, or delegate one agent to contract the other. We show that the choice of 
the principal depends on the sign of the externality. If this is positive, the principal prefers 
to delegate as long as the agency costs are not too high; if the externality is negative, the 
principal prefers to centralize for all sizes of agency costs. 
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This paper studies the choice, made by a principal, between centralization and delegation
of contracts with two agents. Each contract generates some value for the principal, who
is therefore ready to make money transfers to agents in order to contract them. Two are
the main ingredients of our analysis. First, only the principal is initially endowed with the
necessary skills to make a contract eﬀective. However, the principal can transfer these skills
to the agents and allow them to sign contracts. Second, contracts exert an externality on non
contractors, which can be positive (if the contract beneﬁts the non contractor) or negative
(if the contract hurts the non contractor).
We study a simple contracting game, in which the principal and the agents move only once,
after which no further contacts between players can take place. We denote as ”centralization
of contracts” the choice, made by the principal, to directly contract both agents; we denote as
”delegation of contracts” the choice, made by the principal, to sign up one agent and transfer
her the contracting skills necessary to contract the second agent.
We show that the choice of the principal depends in a clear-cut way on the sign of
the externality If this is positive, the principal strictly prefers to delegate one contract to
an agent. This because, by doing so, the principal can decrease the outside option (and,
therefore, the required payment) of one of the agent (the delegated), whose rejection would
induce the complete absence of contracts. This ability of the principal to shape the agents’
outside option depends on the assumed possibility of the principal to commit not to directly
contract the second agent. This result survives for not too high agency costs of delegation.
More precisely, the agency costs should not be larger than the externality generated by each
contract.
If the externality is negative, results are less clear-cut in the absence of agency costs.
Here, if agents accept or reject proposals sequentially, the principal is indiﬀerent between
delegation and centralization, and strictly prefers centralization for arbitrarily small agency
costs to delegation.. This happens also if agents respond simultaneously and the principal can
coordinate agents on his preferred Nash Equilibrium. In contrast, if agents can coordinate
on their preferred Nash equilibrium, the principal strictly prefers centralization. Even in this
case, however, the presence of arbitrarily small agency costs make the principal strictly prefer
centralized contracts.
This paper is related to the recent literature on contracts with externalities. In particular,
2on the strategic manipulation of agents’ outside options are based the papers by Segal (1999)
and by Genicot and Ray (2006). Segal (1999) highlights the fact that the principal may
sacriﬁce eﬃciency of the proposed contracts in order to ensure himself a more advantageous
payoﬀ distribution. In particular, the principal has an incentive to propose contracts that
require actions from agents which are too small (under positive externalities) or too large
(under negative externalities) with respect to the eﬃcient levels. As in the present paper,
this result depends on the assumption that the principal cannot write contingent contracts,
that is, contracts whose eﬀectiveness is made to depend on the acceptance of the contracts
oﬀered to other players.
In Genicot and Ray (2006), a principal chooses the timing of contracts in a setting of
negative externalities. The focus there is on the preferred time proﬁle of contracts for the
principal. They show that the principal chooses not to oﬀer all contracts in the ﬁrst period,
but rather to make acceptable oﬀers in the ﬁrst period to a subset of agents, in order to
lower the outside option of the other agents, who can be contracted at better terms in
following periods. Although there is no reference to the possibility of delegating contracts,
the mechanism by which the principal shapes the agent outside option is similar to the one
studied in our paper.
Finally, there exists a large literature on the advantages and disadvantages of delegation
in the presence of agency costs (see, for instance, Mokkerje and Tsumagari (2004)). However,
this literature mainly focuses on the solution of the trade oﬀ between the agency costs implied
by delegation under asymmetric information and the advantages related to the use of better
informed agents to perform a given task, or related to the relaxation of information processing
constraints. Although the present paper does not investigate this trade-oﬀ, it contributes to
this literature by pointing out, although in an extremely simpliﬁed framework, the possibility
that the type of externalities exerted by contracts may aﬀect the solution of the trade-oﬀ
between delegation and centralization.
2T h e C o n t r a c t i n g G a m e
We consider a game with three players: a principal (P) and two agents (A and B).
32.1 Timing and Actions
The principal moves ﬁrst, and chooses whether to propose contracts to either A or B or both.
The principal can also decide to contract one agent and to transfer to this agent the skills
necessary to contract the second agent. If he chooses to do so, we say that he delegates to
the chosen agent the task to contract the third agent. A contract consists of a real number p
expressing the payment required from (if p<0) or oﬀered to (if p>0) the contracted agent.1
After P has moved, the contracted agents respond to the proposals made by P. We here
distinguish between two possible versions of the game, depending on whether agents A and B
respond simultaneously or in sequence to a joint oﬀer of P. If agents respond in sequence we
refer to the ”sequential acceptance game”, otherwise we refer to the ”simultaneous acceptance
game”.
After P has moved, a subgame is identiﬁed by an element in the set
n
(A,pA),(B,pB),(Ad,p A),(Bd,p B),(A,B,pA,p B)
o
,
where the superscript d indicates that the contracting skills have been transferred to the
agent.
At the subgame (A,pA), agent A responds to P’s oﬀer by either accepting or rejecting it,
after which the game ends.
A tt h es u b g a m e( B,pB), agent B responds to P’s oﬀer by either accepting or rejecting it,
after which the game ends.
At the subgame (A,B,pA,p B), agent A responds to P’s oﬀer by either accepting or
rejecting it, after which agent B responds to P’s oﬀer by either accepting or rejecting it.
At the subgame (Ad,p A), agent A either rejects P’s oﬀer, in which case the game ends,
or accepts P’s oﬀer, in which case he chooses whether to propose a second contract (B,pB)
to agent B. In this second case, agent B observes the contract (B,pB) and decides wether to
accept or reject the oﬀer. In both cases the game ends.
A tt h es u b g a m e( Bd,p B) the same sequence of moves is possible, with the roles of A and
B switched.
1We remark again that contingent contract, setting a payment which depends on the decision taken by
the other agent, are ruled out. The possibility of such contract would invalidate all our results. One way
to naturally rule out such contracts is to assume that agents cannot observe the contract proposed to other
agents (see Segal (1999) for a discussion of this type of contracts and of the equilibrium notion to be used in
this case).
4The game has a ﬁnite horizon, but is not ﬁnite because the range of payoﬀ oﬀe r si sn o t .
2.2 Payoﬀs
Each contract generates a positive value to the oﬀerer. This assumption is without loss of
generality since we are considering a game in which the oﬀerer makes take it or leave it
oﬀers. Values are expressed by the function v,w i t hv(∅) = 0 (no value is created without
contracts). We denote by v(PA|PB) the value generated by contract PA when also PB has
been signed; similar expressions are obtained for other pairs of contracts. The function v is





Contracts generate value not only for the contractors, but also for the agent who is not
involved in a contract. Such external eﬀect may be positive or negative, according to the
object of the contract. Consider, for instance, a case of political competition, in which a party
P can either implement its preferred policy (a point on the real line), or contract other parties
A and B to implement a mediated policy. Suppose the policies of P and A are both on one side
of B’s. If P and A sign such a contract, party B is hurt (negative externality) whenever A’s
policy is further away from B’s policy than P’s, and beneﬁts (positive externality) whenever
P ’ sp o l i c yi sf u r t h e ra w a y .
We will denote by α the payoﬀ accruing to agent A (resp., B) when agent B (resp., A)
is contracted by P. Positive externalities correspond to the case α > 0, negative externalities
correspond to the case α < 0.
Players’ payoﬀsa r eﬁnally given as follows as a function of signed contracts:
(PA,pA) → uP = v(PA) − pA; uA = pA; uB = α.
(PB,pB) → uP = v(PB) − pB; uA = α; uB = pB.
(PA,PB,pA,p B) → uP = v(PA|PB)+v(PB|PA) − pA − pB; uA = pA; uB = pB.
(PA,AB,pA,p B) → uP = v(PA|AB) − pA; uA = v(AB|PA)+pA − pB; uB = pB.
(PB,BA,pB,p A) → uP = v(PB|BA) − pB; uA = pA; uB = v(BA|PB)+pB − pA.
53R e s u l t s
We study the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) of the contracting game in sections 3.1 and 3.2
for the cases of positive and negative spillovers. In section 3.3 we summarize the properties of
these equilibria and draw some conclusions on the principal’s choice between centralization
and delegation of contracts.
3.1 Positive Externalities
3.1.1 Game with Sequential Acceptance
Without loss of generality (by symmetry of the payoﬀ functions of the two agents), we assume
that the principal always delegates to agent A in case he chooses to delegate. We proceed by
backward induction.
Agent B. B faces a subgame in one of the following three classes:
a. {(A,B,pA,p B),(yes)} : both A and B have been oﬀered a contract by P, and A has
accepted. In this case, B accepts if and only if pB ≥ α.
b. {(A,B,pA,p B),(no)},{(B,pB)} : both A and B have been oﬀered a contract by P, and






: P has delegated A to contract B, and A has accepted. In this
case, B accepts if and only if pB ≥ α.
Agent A. A faces a subgame in one of the following three classes:
a. {(A,B,pA,p B)}. If A accepts he gets pA. If he does not accept, he gets α if pB ≥ 0
and 0 if pB < 0.





. A can either reject and get 0, or propose a contract to B, who accepts if
and only if pB ≥ α. So, A gets from contract AB at most v(AB|PA) − α.I tf o l l o w s
that A accepts the delegation contract if and only if pA ≥ α − v(AB|PA).
6In ﬁgure 1 we depict the structure of payoﬀs as a function of agents choices after P
































Figure 1: Histories and payoﬀs for centralized and delegated contracts.
The Principal: P can either make no proposal, or make proposal that either induce one
contract, two ”centralized” contracts PA and PB, or the two contracts PA and AB.
a. P can induce PA by oﬀering pA =0a n de i t h e rn o to ﬀering to B or oﬀering pB < 0.
Note that any oﬀer α >p B ≥ 0 would raise the outside option of A to α,a n dw i t hi t
also the payment needed to make A accept the oﬀer. By inducing PA the principal gets
ap a y o ﬀ of v(PA).
b. P can induce PB by oﬀering pB = 0 and either not oﬀe r i n gt oAo rb yo ﬀering A
pA < α. Either way, the principal gets a payoﬀ of v(PB).
c. To contract both agents, P needs to ensure that B accepts the oﬀer given that A has
accepted. We have seen that this only happens when pB ≥ α. Given this, we know
from previous steps that B will always accept P’s oﬀer. Therefore, A accepts if and
only if pA ≥ α. The maximal payoﬀ for P is therefore v(PA|PB)+v(PB|PA) − 2α.
7d. If P oﬀers a delegating contract to A, we have seen that A accepts if and only if
pA ≥ α − v(AB|PA). Therefore the principal gets a maximal payoﬀ of v(PA|AB)+
v(AB|PA) − α.
From the above analysis, it is clear that if there are no agency costs from delegation (that
is, if v(AB|PA)=v(PB|PA)), then there can be two types of equilibria, depending on the
shape of the function v.
If v(PA)+α >v (PA|AB)+v(AB|PA), then at all SPE there is one contract being
signed. Note that this is the case in which have two contracts is socially ineﬃcient.
If v(PA)+α <v (PA,AB), and therefore two contracts are socially eﬃcient, the at all
SPE the principal oﬀers one contract with delegation, and the delegated agent contracts the
other agent.
If v(PA)+α = v(PA,AB), then both (PA) and (PA,AB) are equilibrium outcomes.
In particular, we note that the history in which the principal oﬀers two contracts and
both contracts are signed is never part of a SPE.
3.1.2 Game with Simultaneous Acceptance
When agents simultaneously respond to the principal’s oﬀers, the only diﬀerence from the
above analysis is in the histories that go through the subgames (A,B,pA,p B). Here we
need to consider the Nash equilibria of the game in which agents simultaneously respond to
(pA,p B). These equilibria with acceptance are as follows (the ﬁrst entry refers to A’s action,
the second to B’s action): if pA ≥ α and pB ≥ α then {(yes,yes)};i fpA ≤ 0a n dpB ≤ 0
then {(no,no),(yes,no)}.I fpA ≥ 0a n dα >p B,t h e n{(yes,no))}.I fpB ≥ 0a n dα >p A,
then {(no,yes)}.N o t et h a ta s y m m e t r i co ﬀers by the principal are weakly dominated by the
oﬀer of a single contract. So, if P oﬀers two contracts (A,B,pA,p B), then these are both
accepted if and only if pA ≥ α and pB ≥ α, which leads to optimal oﬀers of pA = pB = α by
the principal. The SPE are therefore the same as in the sequential version.
3.2 Negative Externalities
Negative externalities are characterized by a negative value of α. Again, and without loss of
generality, we assume that the principal always delegates to agent A in case he chooses to
delegate.
83.2.1 Sequential Acceptance
Note that all the analysis of B’a and A’s behaviour does not depend on the sign of α,a n d
therefore is valid here as well. We therefore only need to look at the principal’s optimal choice
to identify subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes.
The Principal: P can either make no proposal, or make proposal that either induce one
contract, or two ”centralized” contracts PA and PB, or the two contracts PA and AB.
a. P can induce PA by oﬀering pA = 0 and either not oﬀering any contract to B or oﬀering
pB < α.N o t e t h a t a n y o ﬀer pB ≥ 0 would lower the outside option of A to α, but
would also make B accept the contract. On the other hand, any oﬀer 0 >p B ≥ α
would not lower the outside option of A, but would make B accept the contract. So,
by inducing PA the principal gets a payoﬀ of v(PA).
b. P can induce PB by oﬀering pB =0a n de i t h e rn o to ﬀering to A or by oﬀering pA < α.
Either way, the principal gets a payoﬀ of v(PB).
c. To contract both agents, P needs to ensure that B accepts the oﬀer given that A has
accepted. We have seen that this only happens when pB ≥ α.I f0 >p B ≥ α,t h e nB
would reject if A rejects, which gives A an outside option of 0. If pB =0 ,Ba c c e p t si f
A rejects, which gives A an outside option of α.I nb o t hc a s e s ,T h em a x i m a lp a y o ﬀ for
P is v(PA|PB)+v(PB|PA) − α.
d. If P oﬀers a delegating contract to A, we have seen that A accepts if and only if
pA ≥ α − v(AB|PA). Therefore the principal gets a maximal payoﬀ of v(PA|AB)+
v(AB|PA) − α.
From the above analysis, it is clear that if there are no agency costs from delegation
(that is, if v(AB|PA)=v(PB|PA)), then there are two types of equilibria, one in which
Po ﬀers contracts (A,B,0,α) and one in which P oﬀers (Ad,α − v(AB|PA)) and A oﬀers
(B,α). Proposing only one contract is never an equilibrium strategy for the principal as long
as contracts produce non negative value.
3.2.2 Simultaneous Acceptance
When agents respond simultaneously to the principals oﬀers, negative externalities generate
multiple Nash Equilibria in the game played by agents. Suppose that P has proposed pA =0
9and pB = 0. Here, the proﬁle {yes,yes} is the unique equilibrium. However, if pA = α
and pB = α,t h e nb o t h{yes,yes},a n d{no,no} are Nash equilibria. If the principal could
choose the equilibrium played by agents, he would opt for the ﬁrst, while agents would like
to coordinate on the second. Following Ray and Genicot (2006), we will say that in this
second case the Nash Equilibrium is ”coordination proof”. Note also that, in this case, in
order to obtain acceptance of both agents as the unique equilibrium the principal can propose
pA = ε > 0a n dpB = α or pA = α and pB = ε > 0.
We conclude that if we adopt the ”coordination proofness reﬁnement”, then the principal
obtains the maximal payoﬀ of v(PA,PB) − α from delegating one agent to contract the
other agent. If, in contrast, we allow the principal to choose the Nash Equilibrium played by
agents, then P would get a maximal payoﬀ of v(PA,PB) − 2α from oﬀering two contracts
and of v(PA,PB)−α from delegating. Oﬀering two contracts would therefore survive as the
unique SPE of the game.
3.3 The Choice Between Delegation and Centralization
The analysis of the previous section points to a clean-cut diﬀerence between the equilibrium
structure of contracts when contracts exert positive or negative externalities on non contrac-
tors. In particular, whenever the second contract is productive enough and generates positive
externalities, the principal strictly prefers to delegate this contract to an agent. If externali-
ties are negative, the principal is indiﬀerent between contracting both agents in a centralized
manner and delegate the second contract to the agents. This indiﬀerence has been shown to
disappear if the principal can induce agents to choose his most preferred Nash Equilibrium
in the game with simultaneous acceptance.
There is, however, a more intuitive way of breaking this indiﬀerence in favor of a strict
preference for centralization under negative externalities. Let us assume that delegation of
contracts implies some kind of agency cost, that we label C and is here deﬁned as follows:
C ≡ v(PB|PA) − v(AB|PA).
It is clear from the previous analysis that the presence of arbitrarily small agency costs
would break the indiﬀerence of the principal in both games with simultaneous and sequential
acceptance in favor of centralization, and would preserve the strict preference for delegation
under positive spillovers.
The obtained results are summarized in the following two propositions.
10Proposition 1 If externalities are positive, the SPE of the contracting games with sequential
and simultaneous acceptance coincide and induce the following structure of contracts:
i) if eﬃciency requires two contracts to be signed, and agency costs are smaller than
the externality (C<α), then in the unique equilibrium the principal delegates one agent to
contract the other agent, with the principal getting a payoﬀ of v(PA|AB)+v(AB|PA) − α,
the delegated agent a payoﬀ of 0 and the remaining agent a payoﬀ of α.
ii) if eﬃciency requires two contracts to be signed, and agency costs are larger than the
externality (C>α), then in the unique equilibrium the principal oﬀers two contracts and
both agents accept, with the principal getting a payoﬀ of v(PA|PB)+v(PB|PA) − 2α,a n d
both agents get a payoﬀ of α.
iii) if eﬃciency requires two contracts to be signed, and agency costs are equal to the
externality (C = α), both the centralized and delegated contracts of point i) and ii) occur in
equilibrium.
iv) if eﬃciency requires one contract, then in equilibrium only one contract is proposed
and signed, with the principal getting a payoﬀ of v(PA) and the contracted agent a payoﬀ of
0 and the remaining agent a payoﬀ of α > 0.
Proposition 2 If externalities are negative and contracts generate positive value to the con-
tractors:
i) For any amount of agency costs, that is whenever C>0, centralized contracts are the
unique SPE outcome in both games with sequential and simultaneous acceptance.
ii) if the principal can coordinate agents on the preferred Nash Equilibrium then centralized
contracts are the unique SPE outcome of the game with simultaneous acceptance.
iii) delegation is induced as the unique coordination proof SPE of the contracting games
with simultaneous acceptance.
We conclude this section with two illustrative examples of the contracting situations
analyzed in the paper, and of the results of propositions 1 and 2 at work.
Example 1 (Adjacent Gardens) Consider a street with two adjacent gardens, and assume
that a well kept garden produces a utility of β > 0 to the owner and a utility of α > 0 to
the neighbor; a badly kept garden produces zero utility for both. We are assuming that the
neighborhood externality is independent of the owner’s decision to keep his own garden clean.
11Therefore the total utility deriving from only one nice garden in the street is β + α and that
deriving from two nice gardens is 2(β + α).
Finally, we assume that the only way to keep a clean garden is to pay a gardener. The
gardener can supply garden services to both owners (the agents A and B), either by proposing
a contract separately to each owner (centralization), or by proposing a contract to owner A,
under which A has to convince his neighbor B to sign a contract to keep his own garden clean
(delegation).
The optimal centralized contracts are such that the gardener proposes each owner to pro-
vide his services for a sum β. The payoﬀ of the gardener is equal to 2β and the owners receive
α each. A and B have no incentives to deviate because their outside options are equal to α.
A larger payment than α is not an equilibrium, since each agent could proﬁtably deviate.
In case of delegation, the gardener proposes A to provide his services at a price β+α and
transfers A the skills to intermediate with B;Ao ﬀers B a price of β.T h e p a y o ﬀ of the
gardener is equal to 2β + α,Areceives 0 and B receives α. Both A and B have no incentive
to deviate, since their outside option are 0 and α, respectively.
It follows that the preferred choice for the gardener is the delegated contract structure,
yielding a proﬁto f2β + α, as opposed to the proﬁto f2β obtained with centralized contracts.
Example 2 (Consumption Externalities) Consider two consumers, denoted by A and
B,c o n s u m i n gag o o dX. Each consumer is characterized by the demand function p =1− x.
An amount x of consumption by A (resp, by B) generates a gross private utility of x − x2
2
for A (resp. for B) and a positive externality of δx for B (resp. for A). The externality from
the other player’s consumption disappears when one’s own private consumption is positive
(consumptions of the agents are substitute). Therefore if only one consumer consumes a
quantity xA the total utility generated is equal to xA −
x2
A
2 + δxA; if both consumers consume
quantities xA and xB the total utility generated is equal to xA −
x2
A
2 + xB −
x2
B
2 ;i fn oo n e
consumes the total utility is zero.
There is monopolist that produces the good X facing a constant marginal cost normalized
to 0. The monopolist has two possibilities to sell his production: the ﬁrst is to propose a
contract separately to the two consumers (centralization), the second one is to propose a
contract to consumer A and propose to him to contract with B (delegation). A contract is a
proposal to provide a given quantity xI for a payment PI that the monopolist receives from
consumer I ∈ {A,B}. Given a contract between the monopolist and consumer I,t h en e t
12private utility for I is given by xI −
x2
I
2 − PI , while the utility for the monopolist is given by
PI. In the following we assume that δ = 1
2.



















The optimal solution for the monopolist is xA = 1
2, xB = 1
2, PA = 1
8, PB = 1
8.T h e
monopolist’s proﬁtf r o mt h e s ec o n t r a c ti s1
4, while each consumer receives a net utility of 1
4.
Consumers A and B have no incentives to deviate, since their outside options are equal to the
received utilities. By requiring sums which are strictly greater that PA and PB the monopolist
would induce one consumer could to reject the contract (and not buy the good).
















The optimal solution for the monopolist is xA = 1
2, xB =1 , PA = 3
8, PB = 1
4.T h e m o -
nopolist’s proﬁt from these contracts is 5
8, consumer A’s net utility is zero, while consumer
B’s net utility is 1
4. Consumers A and B have not incentives to deviate, since they receive
utilities equal to their outside options. By requiring sums which are strictly greater that PA
and PB the monopolist would induce one consumer could to reject the contract (and not buy
the good).
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have studied a simple example of contracting situation, in which the principal wishes to
contract two agents to perform a given task that he cannot perform by himself. The main
feature of our framework is that contracts generate externalities on non contractors, who can
be hurt by or beneﬁt from the contract signed by the other agent.
13The simple one principal-two agent game we considered has been useful in providing an
intriguing intuition on the eﬀect of externalities on the equilibrium structure of contracts.
We have seen how a positive externality makes the principal prefer a structure of delegated
contracts, which lowers the outside option of the ”middle” agent, whose refusal to sign the
contract would lead, diﬀerently from the case of a centralized structure, to the failure to
perform the task. If the externality is negative, the principal has a strict preference for cen-
tralization only when agents respond simultaneously and can be coordinated on the preferred
Nash equilibrium for the principal; otherwise the principal is indiﬀerent. Strict preference for
centralization reappears with the presence of (even arbitrarily small) agency costs.
One interesting question is whether the game studied in this paper captures, despite its
extremely simple structure (ﬁnite horizon, commitment possibilities, absence of contingent
contracts), some aspects of the behaviour of agents in a contractual situation with external-
ities. The answer is, of course, object of experimental work, which we plan to do as the next
step of this research.
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